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RIGHTS, IMMUNITIES, AND SOVEREIGNS 
Katherine Florey* 
INTRODUCTION 
Professor Wuerth’s provocative article identifies a seemingly stark 
incongruity:  courts have held that foreign corporations are “persons” subject 
to constitutional protections, while generally concluding that foreign 
sovereigns are not.  This seems jarring, particularly when—as Professor 
Wuerth points out—the legal difference between a foreign corporation and a 
foreign government is often technical rather than meaningful.1  To address 
this disparity, Professor Wuerth proposes a new understanding of the 
Constitution—particularly Article III and due process protections—as 
encompassing not just non-sovereign entities like the “Daimler Corporation 
and the Palestinian Liberation Organization” but nations such as Germany 
and Israel.2 
While adopting this interpretation could have sweeping implications,3 
Professor Wuerth’s primary focus is on protections associated with personal 
jurisdiction,4 and her proposed new framework would not, she argues, 
require a radical change in current law.  Rather than locating the specific 
content of protections for foreign nations in the Constitution itself, she argues 
that personal jurisdiction standards for foreign nations could be set by 
Congress—and, further, that they could reasonably be very modest.5  The 
important aspect of such protections, she emphasizes, would be their 
consistent application.6 
 
*  Martin Luther King, Jr. Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law. 
 
 1. See Ingrid Wuerth, The Due Process and Other Constitutional Rights of Foreign 
Nations, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 644 (2019) (noting that “[state-owned enterprises] are not 
treated as the equivalent of foreign states unless a high ‘alter ego’ standard is met”). 
 2. Id. at 635. 
 3. Professor Wuerth notes, for example, that some scholars have “worried that affording 
due process rights to foreign states could hamstring U.S. responses to a foreign policy crises.” 
Id. at 686.  Wuerth is sympathetic to these concerns and believes that a narrower understanding 
of foreign nations’ due process rights is therefore appropriate. See id. at 686–87. 
 4. While Article III is not generally regarded as encompassing personal jurisdiction 
protections, Professor Wuerth challenges that view. See id. at 673–74.  Note, however, that 
Wuerth also argues that while “[t]he Constitution might require personal jurisdiction . . . 
international or general law might set out the actual rules of personal jurisdiction.” See id. at 
648. 
 5. See id. at 684–85 (discussing how a view of sovereigns as constitutionally protected 
could be incorporated fairly seamlessly into current doctrine). 
 6. Id. at 682. 
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So what’s not to like about a change that would, without greatly disrupting 
current doctrine, perhaps ground it on a more solid foundation?  In many 
respects, nothing.  When it comes to certain basic due process and separation 
of powers protections, Professor Wuerth makes a compelling case that it is 
not only illogical but inconsistent with courts’ actual decision-making to hold 
foreign nations outside their sway.7 
At the same time, a notable omission hangs over Professor Wuerth’s 
proposed new understanding.  Since the Constitution’s inception, the main 
avenue of protection for foreign nations has been not constitutional due 
process but foreign sovereign immunity.  Until the State Department’s 
adoption of the “restrictive theory” of sovereign immunity, the shield 
provided by foreign sovereign immunity was generally more potent than 
current minimum-contacts-based personal jurisdiction protections.8  Further, 
as Professor Wuerth discusses, sovereign immunity and personal jurisdiction 
were for many years closely linked concepts.9  While current doctrine does 
not fully reflect this close link,10 foreign sovereign immunity continues to 
safeguard substantially the same interests that personal jurisdiction limits do.  
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, passed in its original form in 1976,11 
ensures that there are few circumstances under which foreign nations without 
significant commercial contacts with the United States can be compelled to 
appear.12  Moreover, foreign sovereign immunity protections are rooted in 
principles of general and international law, which Wuerth suggests should 
also shape our understanding under her proposed framework.13 
The law of foreign sovereign immunity is well entrenched both in 
historical practice and in current law, and—given that it is currently a lever 
controlled by Congress—there is little reason to think that, in the scenario 
envisioned by Professor Wuerth, a congressionally created set of personal 
jurisdiction protections would function much differently in practice.  At the 
same time, there are potential hazards in importing current personal 
jurisdiction ideas—as applied to foreign nations or otherwise—into the 
 
 7. As Wuerth points out, for example, the Court, in cases like Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 
136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016), has appeared to assume without analysis that separation of powers 
protections apply to foreign entities. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 651.  Similarly, it is hard to 
imagine that the Constitution does not in some manner protect proceedings involving foreign 
sovereigns from being tainted by obvious bias or procedural irregularity. 
 8. Foreign sovereigns, that is, were potentially immune for all conduct, even commercial 
activities that had a significant connection to the United States. See Lawrence A. Collins, The 
Effectiveness of the Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity, 4 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
119 (1965). 
 9. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 664. 
 10. See, e.g., Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 395 (1998) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting, in the state sovereign immunity context, that sovereign 
immunity is “hybrid” in nature but could be made fairer by being seen in a light similar to 
personal jurisdiction). 
 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602. 
 12. See infra notes 65–70 and accompanying text. 
 13. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 648 (suggesting that, while the basic requirement that 
personal jurisdiction be present might be mandated by the Constitution, “international or 
general law might set out the actual rules of personal jurisdiction”). 
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already unwieldy world of Article III jurisprudence.  Professor Wuerth has 
ably identified inconsistencies in the law and makes a compelling case that 
the constitutional place of foreign nations deserves reexamination.  Yet any 
theory of their constitutional place should take account of the way in which 
foreign sovereign immunity has worked both historically and in the present 
to protect them. 
This response first looks at the historical understanding of foreign 
sovereign immunity and the ways in which it should inform our reading of 
Article III.  It then considers the role that sovereign immunity protections for 
foreign nations currently play.  It closes with a suggestion that—while the 
sovereign immunity regime is largely adequate to protect other nations’ 
interests—Professor Wuerth’s insights nonetheless have a role to play in our 
understanding of cases involving foreign sovereigns. 
I.  THE HISTORICAL FUNCTION OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
Professor Wuerth notes that, at the time the Constitution was drafted and 
ratified, the idea that foreign sovereigns could be haled into court against 
their will was virtually unthinkable.14  More controversially, she argues that 
Article III incorporated “procedural protections,” including personal 
jurisdiction, that apply to “litigants . . . including foreign states.”15 
Much of Professor Wuerth’s argument rests on the idea that, because 
foreign sovereigns could not be sued without their consent, claims against 
them could not constitute a constitutional “case.”16  The early linkage of 
foreign sovereign immunity, concepts of amenability to service, and Article 
III “cases” is well established.  As Professor Caleb Nelson has argued in an 
influential article that Professor Wuerth discusses, early conceptions of 
sovereign immunity—whether applied to U.S. states,17 the federal 
government,18 or foreign nations19—are difficult to disentangle from 
doctrines of personal jurisdiction.20  In the early United States, “the court’s 
ability to proceed to judgment depended on its ability to command the 
defendant’s appearance”—yet “[u]nder the general law of nations, 
sovereigns were thought to enjoy a broad exemption from command.”21  As 
a result, as Nelson further argues, disputes involving nonconsenting states 
could not—under existing law—turn into “cases” within the meaning of 
Article III of the Constitution because there was no means by which they 
 
 14. See id. at 662–63. 
 15. See id. at 656. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1574–79 (2002). 
 18. See id. at 1584. 
 19. See id. at 1588–89. 
 20. See id. at 1574–75 (explaining how the doctrine of sovereign immunity derived from 
limits on sovereigns’ amenability to suit, in the sense of the court’s power over the defendant’s 
person). 
 21. Id. at 1574. 
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could come under a court’s jurisdiction.22  Importantly, however, Nelson also 
argues—and other commentators have agreed to varying extents23—that the 
Constitution does not impose this limit in itself.  Rather, “background 
principles of general law” simply ensured that, as a practical matter, there 
was no effective way for a plaintiff to sue a resistant sovereign and thus create 
a “case.” 24 
Although Nelson’s analysis is focused on states, disputes involving foreign 
nations appear to have been regarded in a similar way.25  The Supreme Court 
first considered the foreign sovereign immunity issue in The Schooner 
Exchange v. McFaddon,26 a case involving two Americans’ claims to a 
Philadelphia-docked vessel that France had repurposed as a warship.27  The 
Schooner Exchange draws general analogies between the immunities of 
foreign nations and states, alluding to the state-sovereign-immunity 
controversies that gave rise to the Eleventh Amendment28 in discussing 
whether France could be subject to jurisdiction in the United States.29  More 
specifically, however, the Schooner Exchange Court suggested that the issue 
was one of background legal principles—in this case, international law 
norms—that the Constitution had not altered as opposed to an affirmative 
proscription that the Constitution had enacted.  Observing that there was “no 
municipal law, nor any practical construction by the executive, the 
legislative, or the judicial department of our government, which authorizes 
the jurisdiction now claimed,” the Court concluded that “we can only have 
recourse to the law of nations,” which “requires the consent of the 
sovereign . . . before he can be subjected to a foreign jurisdiction.”30 
Professor Wuerth is fully cognizant of this historical connection between 
sovereign immunity and personal jurisdiction.  Her interpretation, however, 
diverges somewhat from the “background principle” view discussed above.  
As Wuerth sees it, Article III constitutionalized some limits on personal 
 
 22. See id. at 1587–89. 
 23. Many commentators, that is, accept the idea of state sovereign immunity as a 
background principle or a matter of federal common law, although some see the doctrine as a 
whole in a somewhat different light than Nelson. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 
U.S. 44, 84 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing state sovereign immunity as a matter 
of federal common law subject to congressional modification). 
 24. See Nelson, supra note 17, at 1627–28 (noting that sovereign immunity can be 
“trace[d] . . . to background principles of general law rather than to anything that the 
Constitution affirmatively enshrined”).  An important implication of the view that the limits 
on sovereigns’ amenability to suit do not derive from Article III itself is that they are 
potentially subject to change by Congress, provided that Congress is otherwise acting within 
its Article I powers. See id. at 1627–29. 
 25. See id. at 1588–89. 
 26. 11 U.S. 116 (1812). 
 27. See id. at 118–19. 
 28. See id. at 124 (suggesting that the general view was that “a state could not be subjected 
to judicial process, unless by the words of the Constitution of the United States” and noting 
that “when it was finally decided in the Supreme Court of the United States that a suit might 
be maintained against a state in the Federal Courts, the states amended the constitution so as 
not to admit of that construction”). 
 29. See id. at 124. 
 30. See id. at 125. 
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jurisdiction, including but not limited to jurisdiction over nonconsenting 
foreign nations.  Wuerth notes that the “judicial power vested by Article III 
had personal jurisdiction . . . defenses baked into it.”31  Wuerth, that is, 
suggests that the Constitution affirmatively incorporated the then current 
understanding that sovereigns were not amenable to suit into its definition of 
the Article III judicial power.  She argues that “Article III . . . required 
personal jurisdiction and notice,” protections that belonged to the 
“Constitution’s structural limitations on federal power.”32  This view of the 
“judicial power” is thus subtly different from the view that eighteenth-
century limits on amenability to process were a background reality 
independent of the Constitution33 subject to alteration by Congress as long 
as it acts within Article I limits.34  It is also different from the way in which 
today’s Supreme Court has generally understood both The Schooner 
Exchange and the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity more broadly, 
which the Court has characterized as a matter of comity, not constitutional 
demand.35 
Wuerth makes other historical arguments for why foreign sovereigns 
should have constitutional protections; among others, she contends that some 
historical evidence exists that foreign sovereigns would have been regarded 
as constitutional “persons” subject to the Due Process Clause.36  But her 
understanding of Article III is a centerpiece of her case.37  At the same time, 
Wuerth sees the implications of the Article III interpretation as less sweeping 
than might be expected.  This is because, as she argues, the content of the 
limits that Article III imposes on foreign sovereigns is not fixed by the 
Constitution.38  She explains, for example, that Congress may choose to 
provide for federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over foreign 
 
 31. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 668–69. 
 32. See id. at 669. 
 33. Because at the time there was no means of summoning unconsenting sovereigns to 
court, the Founders simply assumed that no “Cases” involving them would arise.  Even so, 
Nelson argues, “the Constitution nowhere declares that legislatures cannot override those 
[background] principles and subject states to compulsory process at the behest of individuals.” 
See Nelson, supra note 17, at 1628.  As a corollary to this, Nelson argues that the Constitution, 
with the exception of the particularized limit of the Eleventh Amendment, does not limit 
Congress’s ability to subject unconsenting states to suit, provided Congress acts within the 
scope of its Article I powers. Id. at 1567, 1626–28. 
 34. Id. at Part II.B (summarizing arguments for and against construing Article I to allow 
Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity).  Notably, the arguments Nelson elaborates 
for the no-power-to-abrogate view rest on the idea that the Constitution does not give Congress 
“the power to command state legislatures” in certain ways—an argument that would 
presumably have less force outside the vertical federalism context. See id. at 1642. 
 35. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (“As 
The Schooner Exchange made clear, . . . foreign sovereign immunity is a matter of grace and 
comity on the part of the United States, and not a restriction imposed by the Constitution.”). 
 36. While an extended discussion of this argument is beyond the scope of this response, 
it is worth noting that—while Professor Wuerth does identify important incongruities in 
failing to apply due process protections to some aspects of foreign-sovereign litigation—the 
doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity exerts some protective effects here as well. 
 37. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 637 (describing Article III as protecting foreign 
sovereigns even if the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause does not). 
 38. See id. at 683. 
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sovereigns and that, so long as those standards are applied consistently, they 
do not offend any constitutional principle.39 
Because of this, the ways in which Wuerth’s view differs from the 
“background principle” view of sovereign immunity are functionally and 
perhaps theoretically modest.  The scholarly consensus, that is, suggests on 
the one hand that the Founders believed that suits against unconsenting 
sovereigns were impossible under then current law, yet—on the other hand—
that Congress today nonetheless has the power to alter that background 
reality.  If that is the case, what does it matter whether foreign sovereign 
immunity was incorporated into Article III or was simply a background, non-
constitutional reality? 
As technical as this distinction may seem, however, it is a potentially 
important one.  Courts take Article III limits seriously, and entangling 
personal jurisdiction with Article III seems likely to confuse and complicate 
an already complex area of law as, arguably, adding an Article III dimension 
has with the standing doctrine.40  We should be reluctant, as a result, to 
broaden Article III’s reach—especially so when the historical evidence is, as 
it is here, ambiguous about what Article III requires.  True, contemporaneous 
judicial opinions and commentary emphasized that the Constitution did not 
of its own force grant federal courts jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns.  But 
such sources generally stop short of casting Article III as containing an 
explicit prohibition on such jurisdiction; rather, they simply note that neither 
the Constitution nor any other source purports to alter longstanding principles 
of international law.41  Given the lack of unmistakable historical evidence 
that Article III affirmatively incorporated personal jurisdiction limits as a 
limit on the “judicial power,” reading Article III to incorporate them seems 
potentially imprudent. 
The story of state sovereign immunity provides an apt cautionary tale:  for 
many years, the doctrine was widely seen as a background principle, subject 
to abrogation by Congress, rather than a structural constitutional limitation 
on the federal judicial power.42  The Court’s new understanding of sovereign 
immunity as a constitutional limitation on courts’ power was immensely 
controversial,43 and it is hard to see how it has improved state sovereign 
 
 39. See id. at 636. 
 40. See Jeffrey Kahn, Zoya’s Standing Problem, or, When Should the Constitution Follow 
the Flag?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 673, 699 (2010) (“In a series of revolutionizing Supreme Court 
opinions, the law of standing shifted from its common law legal interest origins to a . . . 
constitutional requirement derived from the ‘case or controversy’ limitation of Article III.”) 
 41. See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 125 (1812). 
 42. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 
1204–05 (2001) (arguing that the Supreme Court has, in recent years, erroneously come to 
regard state sovereign immunity as a constitutional principle, leading to the doctrine’s 
problematic expansion). 
 43. See, e.g., id.; Aviam Soifer, Courting Anarchy, 82 B.U. L. REV. 699 (2002); Carl 
Tobias, Unmasking Federalism, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1833 (2003); Ernest A. Young, State 
Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2; see also College 
Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 688 (1999) 
(suggesting that the Court has continued to spar over the historical role of sovereign immunity 
with “a degree of repetitive detail that has despoiled our northern woods”).  Reviewing all 
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immunity doctrine; rather, it has introduced into it historical and theoretical 
muddle, rigid and unnecessary limitations on Congress’s powers, and jerry-
rigged exceptions to those limitations in areas where they would be 
practically disastrous.44 
Professor Wuerth, to be sure, does not advocate this outcome; instead, as 
noted, she proposes a flexible, congressionally modifiable doctrine that could 
even be made consistent with modern case law.45  But this view would mesh 
somewhat awkwardly with Article III’s heavy machinery,46 and it would 
create layers of complexity not just in the realm of foreign sovereign 
immunity but personal jurisdiction doctrine more generally.  This is 
because—as Professor Wuerth recognizes47—her historical understanding 
would suggest that not just immunity protections but all limits on personal 
jurisdiction are embedded in the constitutional understanding of the “judicial 
power.”48  The implications of such a new understanding, particularly given 
the current confused state of personal jurisdiction doctrine, could be 
profoundly disruptive and unpredictable, and even a strictly originalist view 
of Article III’s text does not demand it. 
II.  FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY UNDER THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITIES ACT 
The previous section has argued both that there are risks in reading new 
limits into our interpretation of Article III’s “judicial power” and that 
historical and textual evidence does not require us to do so.  Of course, if our 
 
these criticisms and assessing their validity is beyond the scope of this response; nonetheless, 
they suggest some of the perils of adding new constitutional limits on federal courts’ 
jurisdiction. 
 44. See, e.g., Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006) (holding 
that Congress may abrogate aspects of state sovereign immunity pursuant to the Bankruptcy 
Clause, despite earlier case law suggesting that Congress’s Article I powers were ineffective 
for this purpose). 
 45. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 685–86 (suggesting new reasoning that might preserve 
the results in existing case law). 
 46. See Katherine Florey, Sovereign Immunity’s Penumbras:  Common Law, “Accident,” 
and Policy in the Development of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
765, 775 (2008) (noting disruptive effects of courts’ treatment of state sovereign immunity as 
an Article III doctrine). 
 47. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 637–38 (arguing that Article III only provides for 
jurisdiction over “cases” in which personal jurisdiction and notice are both proper, “as a matter 
of separation of powers, not due process”). 
 48. Personal jurisdiction doctrine has already been amply criticized for being ambiguous 
in its purpose and for meshing imperfectly with the due process protections in which it is 
supposedly rooted. See, e.g., Steven Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1255 
(2017) (“The pitched battles of modern jurisdiction doctrine . . . haven’t been solved by staring 
harder at the words ‘due process of law.’”).  Indeed, Professor Wuerth herself notes that 
current personal jurisdiction doctrine is an “incoherent mess.” Wuerth, supra note 1, at 682.  
Yet while our current, due process-based notion of personal jurisdiction may be unsatisfactory, 
it is not clear that introducing Article III and separation of powers concerns into the personal 
jurisdiction analysis would provide clarity.  Sachs, for example, suggests re-orienting the 
doctrine toward general and international law, the same principles on which early notions of 
foreign sovereign immunity also rested. See Sachs, supra, at 1319. 
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existing constitutional understanding were inadequate to the task of 
protecting foreign sovereigns’ interests, this calculus might change. 
Professor Wuerth argues, however, that the Constitution itself provides 
only “minimal” protections for foreign sovereigns—what she calls 
“positivist” restrictions, or the idea that the Constitution does not dictate any 
specific personal jurisdiction protections but only requires that whatever 
rules exist are followed uniformly.49  Thus, even under Professor Wuerth’s 
proposed view, Congress would have the primary role in crafting protections 
for foreign sovereigns.50  Yet, in a sense, Congress already does exactly this.  
Statutory sovereign immunity protections are already adequate to protect 
sovereigns’ interests in a variety of situations and, indeed, provide safeguards 
remarkably similar to what personal jurisdiction limits might offer.51  
Further, to the extent Congress sometimes overreaches, it is not clear that a 
more expansive view of Article III limits would provide meaningful 
restraints. 
The idea that Congress should have the primary role in setting the bounds 
of foreign sovereign immunity is less than a half-century old.52  For many 
years, courts dismissed cases against foreign sovereigns when the State 
Department made “suggestions” of immunity.53  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
suggested that, given the “guiding principle” that “the courts should not so 
act to embarrass the executive arm in its conduct of foreign affairs,” it would 
be inappropriate for courts “to deny an immunity which our government has 
seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which the 
government has not seen fit to recognize.”54  Yet inconsistent State 
Department practice led to the area being dominated by an unsatisfactory 
“amalgam of judicial decisions, Executive Branch policies, some uncertain 
notions of international law and wholly inadequate procedure.”55  In 
response, Congress, in 1976, enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(FSIA) in an effort to “set forth consistent guidelines for determining 
sovereign immunity.”56 
The FSIA reads as an affirmative grant of immunity to sovereign nations, 
providing that, subject to some exceptions, “a foreign state shall be immune 
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States.”57  
 
 49. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 684. 
 50. See id. at 685–86. 
 51. See infra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. 
 52. See infra note 55. 
 53. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487–88 (1983). 
 54. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945). 
 55. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States—A Proposal for Reform of 
United States Law, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 901, 905 (1969); see also Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488 
(noting various factors that made the operation of foreign sovereign immunity unclear pre-
FSIA, including political pressures by friendly nations to expand the doctrine in individual 
cases and the failure of some nations to go through the State Department). 
 56. See Karen Halverson, Is a Foreign State a “Person”?  Does It Matter?:  Personal 
Jurisdiction, Due Process, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. 
& POL. 115, 119 (2001). 
 57. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604. 
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Yet it in fact codifies the “restrictive theory” of foreign sovereign 
immunity,58 first articulated in the 1950s, which represented a departure from 
earlier practice under which foreign nations enjoyed immunity for both 
private and public acts.59  Thus, the FSIA has two effects, pointing in 
somewhat opposite directions:  it codifies the previously contingent, case-
specific doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, thus providing greater 
certainty in cases where it applies.  At the same time, it cements the narrower 
understanding of the doctrine that took hold only in the mid-twentieth 
century.60 
Despite the limits on the sovereign immunity protections it recognizes, 
however, the FSIA ensures that, for the most part, U.S. courts do not have 
jurisdiction61 to hear cases against foreign-sovereign defendants.  Of course, 
“for the most part” is not always.  The FSIA has exceptions, to be sure, and 
subsequent amendments have further limited its reach.62  Yet while the 
problems that Professor Wuerth identifies are real, it also bears emphasizing 
that, as to the majority of claims that might be brought against foreign 
sovereigns, the FSIA provides an effective shield.  In particular—as the 
following discussion will explain—the FSIA ensures that foreign-sovereign 
entities are subject to suit in the United States without minimum contacts 
only in somewhat unusual situations. 
To understand why this is the case, it may be helpful to review the FSIA’s 
somewhat complicated provisions and amendments.  First, the FSIA is 
phrased in explicitly jurisdictional terms, providing that “a foreign state shall 
be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the 
States” unless an exception is met.63  The FSIA also includes a broad removal 
provision, allowing any state civil actions to be removed to federal court by 
a foreign-sovereign defendant even if the underlying claims are based in state 
law, thus “ensur[ing to foreign sovereigns] immunity from the jurisdiction of 
state courts” as well, where none of FSIA’s exceptions apply.64  Thus, the 
FSIA broadly shields foreign sovereigns from both federal and state court 
jurisdiction. 
The FSIA, however, includes a number of exceptions, all of which 
originally—in contrast to exceptions added by later amendment—required 
some territorial link to the United States.65  Perhaps the most important of 
 
 58. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983). 
 59. See Collins, supra note 8, at 119.  The restrictive theory first became official U.S. 
policy more than two decades before the FSIA’s enactment through the 1952 Tate Letter, a 
statement of State Department policy. See id. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See infra note 64. 
 62. See Halverson, supra note 56, at 127–28. 
 63. 28 U.S.C § 1604 (2008). 
 64. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 489 (1983). 
 65. Halverson, supra note 56, at 123 (noting that the same principle does not apply to 
later-enacted exceptions); see id. at 121 (“It is significant that each of the exceptions to 
immunity under the 1976 statute (other than the waiver and maritime lien exceptions) contains 
a jurisdictional nexus requirement—that is, a requirement that the property at issue or the 
conduct surrounding the claim bears a territorial connection to the United States.”) 
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these is the exception that codifies the restrictive view, holding foreign 
sovereigns susceptible to suit for commercial activity that is either “carried 
on in the United States by the foreign state,” involving “an act performed in 
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state 
elsewhere,” or relating to an external act related to commercial activity that 
“causes a direct effect in the United States.”66  This exception, which the 
FSIA’s declaration of purpose notes is intended to align U.S. doctrine with 
international law,67 is indeed wide-ranging.  Yet it also requires a significant 
territorial nexus that ensures that foreign sovereigns conducting commercial 
activity are unlikely to be subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts in 
situations where equivalently situated private entities would not be.68  That 
is, specific personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants is normally 
available in situations that map the FSIA’s nexus requirement:  suits arising 
out of ongoing U.S. commercial activity, U.S. activities closely linked to the 
foreign conduct at issue, or foreign activities clearly traceable to U.S. 
effects.69  Indeed, Congress appears to have included the nexus provision 
precisely in order to ensure consistency with personal jurisdiction limits.70 
The required FSIA nexus is not, of course, perfectly coextensive with 
limits on personal jurisdiction, especially as the latter doctrine has evolved 
in recent years.71  The territorial ties required by the FSIA relate to the United 
States as a whole, meaning that it is possible that a foreign sovereign could 
have contacts with multiple states but not enough with any single one to 
constitute minimum contacts with any one state.  By contrast, personal 
jurisdiction analysis in many situations assesses contacts on a state-by-state 
basis, a rule that has frequently had the effect of protecting foreign 
corporations whose contacts may be spread across several states rather than 
targeted at one.72  This slight disparity is mitigated, however, by the fact that 
many federal statutes often invoked against foreign entities provide for 
 
 66. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 
 67. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602. 
 68. See Halverson, supra note 56, at 122 (noting that in the FSIA as originally enacted, 
the “intent of Congress . . . was to treat foreign state defendants [similarly] to other ‘persons’ 
who are entitled to due process protection” for personal jurisdiction purposes). 
 69. See id. (noting the “close correlation between the jurisdictional nexus requirement in 
the statute and the ‘minimum contacts’ requirement of International Shoe”).  Of course, later 
amendments did not continue to require this close connection in all circumstances. 
 70. See id. 
 71. The Supreme Court, for example, has strictly limited the use of general jurisdiction. 
See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).  The Supreme Court has also emphasized 
that U.S.-wide contacts may not suffice to support personal jurisdiction in any one state. See 
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880-81 (plurality opinion). 
 72. See, e.g., McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 898 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting the 
anomaly that “a foreign manufacturer who targeted the United States (including all the States 
that constitute the Nation)” may not be subject to personal jurisdiction in any particular state). 
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nationwide jurisdiction,73 as do the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
certain situations.74 
Some later-added exceptions to the FSIA, however, do not require a 
territorial nexus75 and have occasioned concern that they may go too far in 
allowing U.S. courts to assert jurisdiction over far-flung events involving 
foreign nations.76  Early examples of such exceptions were a 1988 
amendment allowing foreign states to be sued to enforce arbitration 
agreements77 and provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 creating an exception to foreign sovereign immunity for 
certain terrorist and other unlawful acts perpetrated by foreign 
governments.78  The Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), 
enacted in 2016,79 controversially expands this exception80 to clarify that it 
applies to extraterritorial acts that contribute to terrorist activity in the United 
States.81 
Finally, in some cases, the FSIA simply does not apply because an entity 
is insufficiently “sovereign”82 or because a corporation, while perhaps linked 
with a sovereign government to some degree, is not characterized by the 
required degree of government control to trigger sovereign immunity 
protections.83  Such enterprises are, unlike foreign sovereigns themselves, 
 
 73. See, e.g., Carrier Corp. v. Outokumpu Oyj, 673 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that 
courts consider contacts with the U.S. as a whole in the minimum contacts analysis when 
analyzing federal statutes under which Congress has provided for nationwide service of 
process); In re LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust, No. 11 MDL 2262 NRB, 2015 
WL 6243526 (Oct. 20, 2015), at *23 & n. 39 (emphasizing same point and noting that it does 
not seem inconsistent with recent Supreme Court case law). 
 74. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) (providing that service of a summons “establishes personal 
jurisdiction” over a defendant who is not subject to jurisdiction in any state, where the exercise 
of jurisdiction is consistent with the U.S. Constitution). 
 75. See Halverson, supra note 56, at 123.  See also Wuerth, supra note 1, at 640 (noting 
that the FSIA “has been repeatedly amended to reduce the immunity to which foreign states 
are entitled”). 
 76. See Halverson, supra note 56, at 127–28. 
 77. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6) (2008). 
 78. See Halverson, supra note 56, at 116–17. 
 79. Pub. L. No. 114–222, 130 Stat. 852 (2016). 
 80. See Dan Cahill, Student Note, The Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act:  An 
Infringement on Executive Power, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1699, 1714 (2017); Congress Overrides 
Obama’s Veto to Pass Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. 156, 
157 (2017). 
 81. See Congress Overrides Obama’s Veto to Pass Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism 
Act, supra note 80, at 156–57.  As commentators have noted, however, it does not create a 
way to enforce any successful judgments through attachment, meaning that its utility to 
terrorism victims may be limited. See Lisa Ann Johnson, Note, JASTA Say No:  The Practical 
and Constitutional Difficulties of the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, 86 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 231, 236 (2018). 
 82. See, e.g., Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 83. See, e.g., Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 473 (2003) (finding no immunity 
for “companies [that] were, at various times, separated from the State of Israel by one or more 
intermediate corporate tiers”). 
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treated as constitutional “persons” entitled to due process.84  The distinction 
between an entity closely enough connected to a foreign government to be 
treated as an extension of it and one that is not may be quite technical.85  
Professor Wuerth suggests in consequence that subjecting these two 
categories of enterprises to different legal standards is problematic.86 
It should be noted, however, that the personal jurisdiction protections that 
both categories receive, while admittedly not identical, are similar.  
Enterprises not directly controlled by the foreign state are subject to 
jurisdiction following a normal minimum-contacts analysis.87  The foreign 
state and closely related entities enjoy sovereign immunity that likewise 
protects them from the jurisdiction of U.S. state and federal courts unless 
they engage in commercial activities and meet a territorial nexus—one that 
was adopted to mimic the minimum-contacts standard—or one of the FSIA’s 
other exceptions applies.88  Thus, when we speak about foreign entities being 
subject to suit without minimum contacts with the United States, we are 
primarily concerned about the FSIA’s later-added exceptions. 
While this concern is real, it is also relatively narrow.  The FSIA continues 
to shield foreign sovereigns from suit for the vast majority of their 
noncommercial activities and their commercial activities conducted without 
direct connection to U.S. territory.89  Of course, the FSIA is statutory, not 
constitutional, so there is no guarantee that Congress might not, in the future, 
go dangerously far in eroding foreign sovereign immunity protections; 
indeed, it might be argued that in some areas, Congress has already gone too 
far.90  Nonetheless, some constraints continue to exist on Congress.  
Congress’s existing conception of foreign sovereign immunity has been 
highly informed by international norms and background principles91—the 
very considerations that Professor Wuerth suggests are proper for Congress 
to take into account.92  Other branches of government also retain means of 
influencing the scope of foreign sovereign immunity.  Insofar as foreign 
 
 84. See Livnat, 851 F.3d at 56 (holding that the Palestinian Authority was not a sovereign 
protected by the FSIA and hence the “usual personal-jurisdiction doctrine” requirements 
should apply to it under the Fifth Amendment). 
 85. See, e.g., Dole, 538 U.S. at 470–480. 
 86. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 643 (noting disparity in treatment between state-owned 
enterprises and otherwise similar foreign corporations). 
 87. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 88. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 89. See supra notes 65–70 and accompanying text. 
 90. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 91. Indeed, the FSIA, at least in its original form, has been frequently described as 
codifying existing international law principles in effect at the time of its passage. See, e.g., 
Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 319-20 (2010) (“[O]ne of the primary purposes of the FSIA 
was to codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, which Congress recognized as 
consistent with extant international law.”); Stephens v. National Distillers and Chemical 
Corp., 69 F.3d 1226 1234 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he FSIA . . . primarily codif[ied] pre-existing 
international and federal common law.”). 
 92. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 647–48 (suggesting that the Constitution might require 
that personal jurisdiction be present, but that international or general law might govern the 
specifics of when personal jurisdiction is proper). 
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sovereign immunity (or other jurisdictional) protections may be rooted in 
international law,93 the Charming Betsey canon of construction—that “an act 
of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any 
other possible construction remains”94—functions to prevent accidental 
overreach.  Likewise, the Executive Branch can provide input to Congress in 
situations where a rollback of sovereign immunity might hinder international 
relations. 
To be sure, Congress may choose to intentionally skirt such limits, as 
arguably it did when it dismissed Executive Branch objections and overrode 
President Obama’s veto to pass JASTA.95  But if Congress is overly willing 
to expand U.S. jurisdiction over foreign nations, it is not clear that Professor 
Wuerth’s proposal provides a clear solution.  Wuerth suggests that it may be 
the case that “due process protects foreign states[,] but due process only 
entitles them to what Congress gives them.”96  It is nevertheless unclear how 
this differs significantly from Congress’s existing de facto control over the 
scope of foreign sovereign immunity.  Perhaps Congress might take its 
responsibility more seriously if its protections for foreign nations were more 
clearly grounded in limits on the judicial power under Article III.  That 
argument, however, seems speculative. 
Professor Wuerth suggests that an advantage of her proposed interpretation 
is that whatever protections Congress enacts would apply equally to foreign 
corporations and foreign sovereigns.97  In some cases, however, there are 
good reasons for treating such entities differently.98  International comity 
considerations often dictate according foreign sovereigns stronger 
protections than private actors receive—and, indeed, the FSIA provides for 
such protections in most situations.  At the same time, international law may 
justify holding foreign sovereigns accountable for terrorism or other 
unlawful acts under principles of universal jurisdiction99 in situations where 
a private party’s activities might be considered too remote from the United 
States.  Moreover, Congress has considerable ability to equalize personal 
jurisdiction protections for foreign sovereign enterprises and other foreign 
corporations if it so chooses, altering the former through the FSIA and the 
latter by, for example, providing more expansively for nationwide 
jurisdiction.100 
None of this is to say that there might not be value in bringing foreign 
sovereigns within the constitutional fold in some fashion.  But any theory of 
 
 93. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 94. See Murray v. The Charming Betsey, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804). 
 95. See Cahill, supra note 80. 
 96. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 685. 
 97. See id. at 684. 
 98. See Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96-99 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (noting comity considerations and structural protections that justify treating foreign 
sovereigns differently from other actors). 
 99. See Halverson, supra note 56, at 126–27 (noting that some legislators have attempted 
to justify subjecting foreign nations to suit for acts of terrorism by invoking principles of 
universal jurisdiction for certain violations of international law). 
 100. See supra notes 73–74. 
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how to do so should account for existing immunity protections—the primary 
means by which Congress has implemented the international norms that have 
guided this area since the nation’s beginnings. 
CONCLUSION 
From the United States’ earliest days, foreign sovereign immunity has 
protected the interests of foreign nations in U.S. courts.  It has done so despite 
the fact that it has generally been seen as a doctrine rooted not in Article III 
limits but in international and general law norms.  Given this status quo, 
advocating for a significant shift in our constitutional understanding may be 
premature. 
This is not to say that the status quo is perfect or that Professor Wuerth’s 
article does not contain valuable insights.  Wuerth makes a strong case that 
some constitutional protections—such as basic elements of due process—
should also be understood to apply in proceedings involving foreign 
sovereigns.  As she astutely points out,101 cases like Bank Markazi v. 
Peterson,102 in which the Court considered whether Congress’s designation 
of specific Iranian assets to be used to satisfy individual judgments violated 
“constraints placed on Congress and the President,”103 are difficult to 
understand as anything other than a recognition that structural constitutional 
protections apply to foreign nations as well.104  It is equally difficult to 
imagine that bedrock due process principles such as notice and unbiased 
proceedings would not apply to cases involving foreign nations—even 
though the exact constitutional mechanism underpinning such an application 
of them may be unclear.  For this reason, Wuerth’s fundamental call to better 
understand the various strands of doctrine applicable to foreign nations and 
integrate them with other constitutional mandates is an important 
contribution in an area of growing concern. 
Foreign sovereign immunity, however, provides an important piece of this 
picture as well.  Expectations that nonconsenting sovereigns would be mostly 
or entirely immune from suit have guided the judicial treatment of foreign 
nations from the Constitution’s drafting to the present.  Even today, the 
FSIA’s territorial nexus requirements shield foreign sovereigns in many 
situations, requiring contacts similar to those needed for personal 
jurisdiction.  Any theory of how foreign sovereigns should be regarded in the 
future should take into account how the existing doctrine of foreign sovereign 
immunity has mostly succeeded in protecting them in the past. 
 
 101. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 651–52 (noting that “the entire Supreme Court assumed 
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